

~~TOP SECRET~~

#1297

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS
CODEWORD MATERIAL

CSB # 00013

26 July 1955

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCSB:

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report. C C

References: (a) CSB # 00011 dated 11 July 1955.
(b) CSB # 012 dated 19 July 1955.
(c) COMSEC 7-1 dated 7 June 1955
(d) COMSEC 7-2 dated 25 July 1955.

1. Quoted below are comments received to date from USCSB members in regard to Clark Committee recommendations of primary interest to USCSB. Additional comments, if any, will be circulated as received.

a. Recommendation No. 4.

THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES AND NSA CONTINUE TO STRIVE FOR A HIGHER DEGREE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY: THAT THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, INCLUDING PLAIN TEXT MESSAGES AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTED MESSAGES, BE RESTUDIED BY USCSB (OR THE COMBINED BOARD AS RECOMMENDED IN THIS REPORT) WITH A VIEW TOWARD REDUCING TO THE LOWEST PRACTICABLE LEVEL THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION RELEASED THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS; AND THAT NSC 168 BE REEXAMINED TO ASCERTAIN IF THE DIRECTOR, NSA, HAS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT HIS COMSEC RESPONSIBILITIES.

COMMENTS:

STATE: The first part of this recommendation needs no comment since it is obvious that the military services and NSA will continue to strive for a higher degree of cryptographic security.

The recommendation that the problem of communications security, including traffic analysis, be restudied by USCSB shows that the Task Force did not understand the provisions of NSC 168. For example, if transmission security should be studied, NSC 168 states that "it shall be the responsibility of the Director, NSA, to review and evaluate communications procedures developed by the departments and agencies to determine whether such procedures will provide and maintain transmission security, and to recommend revisions and additional rules and procedures as required". This is being done and there is no evidence submitted that additional studies are needed.

TS# 179241
Page 1 of 14 pages
Copy 7 of 150031-8

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 0001

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

STATE: The question of sufficient authority for the Director, NSA,
(Cont'd) could also be answered by a study of NSC 168. This directive contains the COMSEC responsibilities of the Director, NSA, and gives him the authority to carry them out. Any COMSEC responsibilities which the Task Force had in mind beyond those spelled out in NSC 168 are in the basic responsibility of the Special Committee of the NSC or the USCSB.

Recommendation No. 4 might be placed in the category of those which can and should be adopted, but it should be pointed out that this recommendation only calls for a restudy of matters which are already under study in accordance with the provisions of NSC 168 and for a re-examination of NSC 168 to find that it has been carefully drafted to cover all contingencies in the COMSEC field.

DEFENSE: The elements of this recommendation are generally similar to those in my letter of 31 May 1955 (enclosure with reference (c)), to the members of USCSB. I believe the Board should proceed with a formal study of the subjects mentioned in this recommendation and in my letter. However, re-examination of NSC 168, to ascertain if DIRNSA has sufficient authority to carry out his COMSEC responsibilities as recommended by the Clark Task Force, is an undertaking which may go somewhat beyond USCSB's present competence.

NAVY: Concur that efforts to attain a higher degree of cryptographic security should continue. With regard to the study of the plain language traffic problem and traffic analysis of encrypted messages, the military services have long recognized this weakness and are taking corrective action on the military portion of the problem within capabilities. No real solution to this problem is possible until military cryptographic capabilities are modernized to match the operational and technical improvements made in military communications since World War II. Significant improvement in military cryptographic capability is expected when cryptographic equipment now under development and/or procurement becomes available. With regard to the recommendation that NSC 168 be re-examined, it is noted that this was an interim directive on trial through October 1955 and is currently being reviewed.

CSB # 00013

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

AIR FORCE: Concur in recommendation. The Air Force position concerning this subject was thoroughly presented in Memorandum for Chairman, USCSB, subject: (U) U. S. Communications Security, dated 5 July 1955 (enclosed with reference (d)). With regard to re-examination of NSC 168, it is recommended that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be obtained during any review of this document.

CIA: There is no question concerning this aspect of the recommendation. Since the development of cryptographic equipment is primarily the responsibility of NSA, recommendations to increase their capabilities in this field should be made by them.

USCSB should be responsible for the study. A subcommittee should be established under USCSB to conduct the study, within the limitations of NSC 168, and to make the necessary recommendations. The recommendations should include a statement of policy, which can be later issued as a USCSB or NSC directive: (1) establishing the authority to prescribe minimum standards for the development of communications procedures which will provide and maintain transmission security, and (2) requiring the various departments and agencies of the Government to submit periodic reports to USCSB which will indicate that they have examined their communications security systems, procedures and practices and have determined that they are operating in conformance with the prescribed minimum standards.

The above subcommittee should also be charged with the responsibility for re-examining NSC 168.

TREASURY: This recommendation concerns the desirability of reduction in plain text. The comments made in paragraph four of our memorandum of July 12, 1955, (enclosed with reference (d)), commenting upon General Erskine's memorandum of 31 May 1955, appear to be equally applicable here. Some danger exists in either alternative but the whole situation should in our opinion be reviewed to determine in which direction the greatest security lies.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

ARMY:

The Army member believes that the state of US COMSEC should be kept under thorough review at all times and therefore, as a matter of principle, believes that the recommended COMSEC study can and should be made. However, for any study to be effectual it must not be directed towards any given component of COMSEC as a matter of emphasis, but should instead cover all elements of COMSEC. Accordingly, it is recommended that USCSB, at the earliest opportunity, study the adequacy of US COMSEC and determine requirements to insure continuing and increasing security of US telecommunications.

While re-examination of NSC 168 to determine if DIRNSA has sufficient authority to carry out his COMSEC responsibility can be made it should not be made alone. Instead, the Army member recommends that all facets of NSC 168 be examined.

TS#

179241

Page

4 of 14 pages

Copy

1 of 150034-9 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

b. Recommendation No. 5.

THAT A SINGLE BOARD WITH APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE POLICY COGNIZANCE OVER COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY. IF THE RECOMMENDATION TO PLACE THE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF ELINT UNDER NSA IS ADOPTED, THEN POLICY GUIDANCE FOR ELINT AS WELL AS COMINT AND COMSEC SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY THE PROPOSED SINGLE BOARD.

COMMENTS:

STATE: The matter of a single board to have cognizance over communications intelligence and communications security was considered at the time the USCSB was established. The fact that COMINT and COMSEC are related to telecommunications and that some agencies are working in both fields are not valid arguments for a single board. Since COMINT is concerned with the communications of foreign governments and COMSEC deals with U. S. Government communications, they are no more related than foreign communications are related to U.S. communications. A COMINT board is not interested in the production of cryptographic material, the development of new equipments or the violations of security in our own cryptographic operations and a COMSEC board is not interested in the production and distribution of information from the messages of other governments. The idea that both USCIB and USCSB are substantially comprised of the same agency membership is not a reason for having a single board unless one person in each agency can represent both functions. In the Department of State there is a wide separation between the organization handling foreign intelligence and that handling the security of U. S. telegrams.

Recommendation No. 5 should be placed in the category of those not considered appropriate for adoption, for the reasons stated above.

DEFENSE: The Clark Task Force recommendation that there should be a single national board with cognizance over COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC parallels my views. The three elements are inextricably inter-related, and I believe it is only a matter of time before we come to such an organization.

Subjects under the cognizance of USCSB in most cases are also of interest to USCIB: the greatest part of this Board's business up to now has required consideration by both boards. The present procedure of bandying issues

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP78S05450A000100150031-9

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB #00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

DEFENSE CONT'D.:

between the boards makes for a slower, less clean-cut, and more bureaucratic handling than would be the case if the various aspects of each issue were considered within the framework of a single authoritative body.

The recent assignment of national policy supervision over ELINT, in addition to COMINT, to USCIB is a step toward the formation of a consolidated national board. The principal obstacle to proceeding with the next step of consolidation is the divided authority within many of the member agencies between the communicators and the intelligence elements. More often than not, the same individual cannot himself speak with equal expert knowledge and authority concerning COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC.

However, this is not an insuperable obstacle. I doubt it would be more difficult organizationally to arrange dual or alternate agency memberships when necessary on a single board than it is now to deal through two distinct boards with broadly overlapping interests.

The whole issue is one that cannot be resolved quickly or easily. Before long this Board will have to evaluate its first two years' experience, as directed by the Special Committee of the NSC for COMSEC. One important element in this evaluation will be the subject of the present Clark Committee Recommendation No. 5.

NAVY:

The first sentence of this recommendation is not concurred in. The concept of a single policy-making body for COMINT and COMSEC is fundamentally unsound because the function of collection, production, and dissemination of communications intelligence is distinct and separate operationally from the function of maintaining communication security. Although it is admitted that there are close technical relationships between these two functions, the functions themselves are quite separate and distinct. There is a well understood responsibility of each service or agency operating communications to maintain communication security. Any effort to place policy-making responsibility for these two functions in a single board is destined to result in either a board whose efforts are slanted toward one function to the detriment of the other or a board whose membership is so large that it will become an unwieldy and impotent organization.

TS# 179241
Page 6 of 17 pages
Copy 7 of 150034 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP78S05450A000100150031-9

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB #00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

NAVY CONT'D.:

The second sentence of the recommendation is not commented on since it involves a matter not under the cognizance of the USCSB.

AIR FORCE: It is the Air Force opinion that a combined board acting for COMINT and COMSEC should not be established. We feel that USCSB as presently constituted is too large, and a merger as recommended would result in further increase in size. We believe that study should be made to reduce the size of USCSB and that the views of JCS should be obtained before any decision is made in this respect.

CIA: It is believed that it is inadvisable at this time to establish a single board as recommended. Although many of the matters which are of interest to USCSB are also of interest to USCIB, the primary functions and responsibilities of these two boards are sufficiently divergent to justify their separate existence.

AEC: It appears that the proposed arrangement would be satisfactory to the AEC from the standpoint of possible benefits to and contributions by the AEC in the areas of COMSEC and COMINT, including ELINT.

TREASURY: We concur in general but feel that it is difficult to take a definite position on this matter without more complete information than we now have as to the present functions and methods of operation of USCIB as well as what functions and methods of operation would be contemplated for a new joint board. Probably Treasury membership would be desirable.

ARMY: The Army member does not feel that USCIB and USCSB should be combined as a single Board at this time. Insofar as Army alone is concerned, there would be no objection to combining USCIB and USCSB in a single Board, since the responsibility for policy determination within the Army for both COMINT and COMSEC matters is centered in the ACofS, G-2, DA, who is the Army representative on both USCIB and USCSB. It is recognized, however, that other Departments or Agencies on both USCIB and USCSB hold different offices within their respective organizations responsible for COMINT and COMSEC policy matters, and therefore require

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP78S05450A000100150031-9

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB #00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

ARMY CONT'D.:

different representation on the two Boards. Furthermore, there are organizations represented on USCSB but not on USCIB. Accordingly a combined USCIB-USCSB Board would require a large and diverse membership which would negate any advantages of combining the two separate Boards.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

c. Recommendation No. 8.

THAT THE PRESENT BASIC COMMUNICATIONS (CRYPTOGRAPHIC) SECURITY PLAN, PROVIDING FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION OF OPERATIONS, BE CONTINUED; THAT EACH AGENCY AND SERVICE MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND VIGOROUS TRAINING PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIOLATIONS.

COMMENTS:

DEFENSE: Concur generally with this recommendation, provided that the actions suggested in Recommendation No. 4 of Part 1 and in my letter of 31 May 1955 be undertaken.

NAVY: Concur.

AIR FORCE: The Air Force concurs in recommendation, however, suggests that the words "security plan" should read "security arrangement". The Air Force is pursuing a vigorous inspection and training program. Our problems in this area are outlined in our memorandum for Chairman, USCSB, 5 July 1955.

CIA: Concur.

TREASURY: Concur.

ARMY: The Army member concurs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

d. Recommendation No. 9.

THAT NSC DETERMINE WAYS AND MEANS TO CONTROL MORE EFFECTIVELY RELEASE OF VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES VIA CLEAR TEXT MESSAGES BEING TRANSMITTED OVER GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS.

COMMENTS:

DEFENSE: This recommendation bears on the balance between adequate COMSEC on one hand and the necessity for economical use of communications facilities on the other. The problem would not appear to be one for NSC consideration, at least at this stage. It is in effect an element of Recommendation No. 4 of Part 1 above, and should be considered in the context of that recommendation.

NAVY: This recommendation is concurred in insofar as the communications of non-military agencies are concerned. The military services have long recognized this weakness and are taking corrective action on the military portion of the problem within capabilities. No real solution to this problem is possible until military cryptographic capabilities are modernized to match the operational and technical improvements made in military communications since World War II. Significant improvement in military cryptographic capability is expected when cryptographic equipment now under development and/or procurement becomes available.

AIR FORCE: With respect to Air Force position, refer to Memorandum for Chairman, USCSB, 5 July 1955.

CIA: The responsibility to provide additional controls on the use of clear text messages should be assigned to the USCSB and not to the NSC as this is a responsibility clearly within the charter of the USCSB. (In the event agreement cannot be reached, procedure prescribed in paragraph 1g of NSC 168 will apply.)

TS# 179241

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

TREASURY: Concur.

ARMY: The Army member feels that this recommendation can and should be adopted. This study should be conducted by appropriate working elements of USCSB and results submitted to NSC for determination.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP78S05450A000100150031-9

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

e. Recommendation No. 10.

THAT THE GENERAL TENDENCY WITHIN THE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY AGENCIES TO OVEREMPHASIZE THE SPECIAL SECURITY FACETS OF THEIR OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO BASIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS FEATURES BE EXAMINED OBJECTIVELY AND COMPREHENSIVELY BY COMPETENT, TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED AUTHORITY TO INSURE THAT SUCH OVEREMPHASIS IS NOT PRODUCING UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME WHICH WILL GROW TO COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC FIGURES IN WARTIME, AND PRODUCING A SYSTEM WHICH MAY FAIL IN AN EMERGENCY BECAUSE IT WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE READJUSTMENT OF BASIC OPERATIONAL PRACTICES AT A CRITICAL TIME.

COMMENTS:

DEFENSE: The terms of this recommendation suggest an element of prejudgment. In one sense it contradicts recommendation 9 just above.

Existing agencies would be as well fitted to conduct the objective and comprehensive examination such as is recommended, if such an examination is in fact necessary, which I doubt.

NAVY: Concur.

AIR FORCE: The Air Force concurs.

TREASURY: We concur and believe that standardization is desirable as far as it is possible, realizing, however, that complete standardization is not entirely practicable in all agencies, i.e., State Department.

ARMY: The security features of certain COMINT and COMSEC activities are considered extremely sensitive. It is believed that study of this matter should be conducted by appropriate representatives of the COMINT and COMSEC community who are thoroughly familiar with special security requirements of both COMINT and COMSEC: Appropriate representatives of the Communications and Electronics elements within the Department of Defense should be invited to participate, if they so desire. The Committee studying this problem should not be a standing committee, but it should be ad hoc.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB #00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

f. Special Recommendation.

THAT THE PRESIDENT SET UP A SPECIAL COMMISSION COMPOSED OF TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED CIVIL AND MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS REPRESENTATIVES, TO SURVEY AND PRODUCE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WAYS AND MEANS TO INSURE THE MORE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ALL COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CASE OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

COMMENTS:

STATE: This does not appear to be of concern to communications security except in an indirect way and no questions have been presented which need to be considered by the USCSB.

DEFENSE: This recommendation is largely outside the competence of USCSB to comment on. To the extent that it is within the Board's competence, it is viewed with reserve, chiefly for organizational reasons. The discussion following the recommendation refers to various similar bodies that have been formed or that exist now. Superimposition of another commission, temporary or permanent, on the existing structure is in principle likely to be less effective than utilization of the existing structure. It is believed that many of the aims of this recommendation are being achieved under the monitorship of ODM.

NAVY: No comment since it concerns a matter not under the cognizance of the USCSB.

AIR FORCE: The Air Force does not consider this recommendation to be within the purview of USCSB, and does not desire to comment.

ARMY: This recommendation, while of interest to both the COMINT as well as the COMSEC community, includes areas outside of their immediate areas of interest. Accordingly, the Army member of USCSB neither opposes nor recommends adoption of the proposed study. It is felt, however, that should such a commission be established that representatives of both the COMINT and COMSEC community should be invited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP78S05450A000100150031-9

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSB # 00013

Subject: Extracts from Appendix I of the Hoover Commission
(General Mark Clark) Report.

g. Section XV Annex I (Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES))

COMMENTS:

DEFENSE: The proposed ICES of the proposed Combined Intelligence Board appears to be a somewhat more cumbersome means of achieving what is now accomplished through other means. Certainly it is essential to insure that the views and background of experience of the communications-electronics elements not directly represented on the Board are appropriately brought to bear on its deliberations, and the members should insure that this is done. On principle, however, it is undesirable to increase the already formidable number of committees, subcommittees, groups, etc.

As a practical matter, moreover, it is premature at this time to consider the establishment of such a subcommittee, before the various concrete problems arising from the recommendation to establish the Combined Intelligence Board have been considered.

TREASURY: We concur in general on the assumption that the subcommittee would be related to the proposed new combined board, i.e., combining USCIB and USCSB. Under item 3 (reference (a) page 43) concerning the composition of the board, we believe the phrase "member having no active interest" should be clarified.

2. This item has been placed on the agenda for the Third Meeting of USCSB to be held on 29 July 1955.

25X1A9A



Acting Executive Secretary, USCSB

TS# 179241
Page 14 of 14 pages
Copy 1 of 1 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~